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[In their 2001 article “Feeling Sorry? — Tell Someone Who Cares: The 
Irrelevance of Remorse in Sentencing”, Bagaric and Amarasekara argue 
that offender remorse should be abandoned as a mitigating factor in sen-
tencing because it lacks adequate doctrinal support. The present article 
argues that Bagaric and Amarasekara’s survey of reasons for remorse be-
ing a mitigating factor is not wide enough, and, moreover, that their ar-
guments against the reasons that they do consider are, at least, 
controversial. In the course of this reply, the present article also replies to 




In Feeling Sorry? — Tell Someone Who Cares: The Irrelevance of Remorse in 
Sentencing, Bagaric and Amarasekara argue that “there is no justifiable doctrinal 
basis for according a sentencing discount to offenders who evince regret for what 
they have done”.1 That remorse may be treated as a mitigating factor in sentencing 
is, as the authors note, a settled principle in sentencing law in many jurisdictions. In 
Bagaric and Amarasekara’s view, however, this common legal principle is in fact 
merely an “intuition” or “feeling” that lacks adequate theoretical support. They 
survey a number of possible supports for this “intuition”, arguing that each in turn 
fails to provide the proffered justification. From this they conclude that no theoreti-
* Lecturer, School of Law, La Trobe University. 
 
1 Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, Feeling Sorry? — Tell Someone Who Cares: The Irrelevance of 
Remorse in Sentencing, 40 HOWARD J. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 364, 364 (2001). 
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cal support can in fact be found for it, and that therefore “remorse should hence-
forth be abandoned as a sentencing consideration”.2 (It is not clear whether they see 
such abandonment taking the form of an explicit legal prohibition on judges taking 
remorse into account, or whether they envisage judges, in their discretion, no longer 
feeling a call to do so.) 
 
The present article is a critical reply to Bagaric and Amarasekara. It seeks to defend 
the idea that remorse may be treated as a mitigating factor in sentencing by counter-
ing Bagaric and Amarasekara’s criticisms. (For ease of reference I shall henceforth 
refer to the idea that remorse may be treated as a mitigating factor in sentencing as 
“the remorse principle”. I shall not here be concerned with defending the stronger 
views that remorse must always mitigate sentence or ought normally to do so.) I 
shall proceed by critically examining Bagaric and Amarasekara’s main points 
against the remorse principle, in the order in which they present them. (I shall not, 
however, address other important matters that they discuss, such as the practical 
difficulties in distinguishing genuine remorse from feigned remorse or from distinct 
experiences such as self-pity. The discussion here shall assume cases of genuine 
remorse.) In the course of replying to Bagaric and Amarasekara, I shall also reply to 
some arguments against the remorse principle presented by R. A. Duff, who is one 
of the subjects of Bagaric and Amarasekara’s criticism even though he himself 
agrees that remorse should not mitigate sentence.3
 
With regard to definitional preliminaries, Bagaric and Amarasekara take it that 
remorse is “the feeling of regret or sorrow for what one has done”.4 While this is 
not wrong, it does, in my view, need supplementing. Of course, any definition of 
“remorse” will be more or less contentious; the term is used with some latitude in 
ordinary language, and is not subject to a standard definition in law, psychology or 
philosophy.5 Nevertheless, as an enabling assumption of the present paper, I shall 
hazard a definition by proposing that remorse is an experience involving a particu-
lar complex of dynamically interrelated elements of feeling, understanding, desire 
and will.6 More specifically, it involves the kind of suffering felt by someone who 
acknowledges a wrong they have done to another person, who regrets doing it and 
wishes that they had not done it, who now desires somehow to repair the harm done 
and somehow to redeem themself, and who at some stage actually wills to action in 
some way in relation to that end (whether ultimately “successfully” or not). This 




2 Id., at 375. 
3 R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 118–21 (2001). 
4 Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 1, at 364. 
5 Michael Proeve et al., Mitigation Without Definition: Remorse in the Criminal Justice System, 31 
AUSTRALIAN N.Z.J.C 16, 17–18 (1999). 
6 I draw here upon STEVEN TUDOR, COMPASSION AND REMORSE: ACKNOWLEDGING THE SUFFERING 
OTHER chs 6–8 (2001) and JUSTIN OAKLEY, MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 6 (1992). See also 
RAIMOND GAITA, GOOD AND EVIL: AN ABSOLUTE CONCEPTION, ch 4 (2d ed. 2004). 
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II NO REWARD FOR DOING WHAT IS EXPECTED? 
The first and most interesting of Bagaric and Amarasekara’s arguments is that since 
(i) remorse is what an offender ought to feel, and (ii) one should not be rewarded 
simply for doing what one ought to do, therefore (iii) an offender should not be 
rewarded simply for feeling remorse.7 Let us examine the second premise first. 
“[R]ewards,” say Bagaric and Amarasekara, “are not handed out for merely doing 
what is expected — only for clearly going beyond one’s moral and/or legal obliga-
tions”.8 (I shall take it that by an “expected” action or response, Bagaric and Ama-
rasekara mean an action or response that one ought to do or is required or obligated 
to do rather than one that is predicted to occur — though, of course, an action may 
be both.) Bagaric and Amarasekara find it “curious” that criminals are treated 
differently to surgeons, police officers and plumbers who do what is expected of 
them and do not get rewarded. They assert that “[t]he only possible rationale for 
this is the perverse logic that the more rotten one is the less we can expect of them”9 
so that, presumably, we do not expect the “rotten” offender to experience remorse 
and thus may properly reward them when they do. Bagaric and Amarasekara op-
pose such a policy, saying that, in fact, “[t]he more of a scoundrel one has become, 
the more that can rightly be expected of him or her in order to claw his or her way 
back into the community”.10
 
It should be conceded that there are indeed limitations to the idea that a “reward” is 
an appropriate response to an offender’s remorse. However, Bagaric and Ama-
rasekara have not quite captured that sense of inadequacy. First of all, they do not 
explain the sense of “reward” that they use. They seem, however, to be working 
with what we might call a conception of reward as a deserved or merited benefit, in 
contrast with a more behaviourist and less moral conception of reward that sees it 
simply as a benefit to induce a particular action. If so, then it would appear to be 
simply not true that we only give desert rewards for doing more than is required. 
For example, the school student who is (normatively) “expected” to pass their 
exams and does so may nevertheless be rewarded by their parents for passing. This 
type of reward is the congratulatory type of reward, one which recognises a valu-
able (even if required or predicted) achievement and congratulates the person for it. 
Thus it is not the case that the “perverse logic” Bagaric and Amarasekara identify is 
the only possible rationale for rewarding remorse. The reward may well be a kind 
of congratulation or — indeed, better — recognition or acknowledgment. 
 
In any case, surgeons, police and plumbers typically are rewarded for what they do 
— they are doing a job they are already paid to do or that they expect to get paid 
for. Thus, their desert-reward is based on their earning it. They are not, though, it is 
true, rewarded for doing what is expected of them. Rather what is expected of them 
is so expected because they have been or will be paid for what they do. To reward 
fulfilling that sort of expectation would indeed be odd; it would be double-payment. 
7 Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 1, at 364. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id., at 364-5. 
763   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 10 NO 2 
 
                                                          
A parallel does not arise in the case of criminal offenders, for the expectations of 
them are of a different kind (unless one subscribes to the view that offending is an 
obtaining of advantage without due payment). It is not, therefore, prima facie odd 
that criminals should be treated differently in this respect. 
 
When Bagaric and Amarasekara propose that more is expected of the greater 
scoundrel, what kind of expectation is in view? It would seem that in this context 
this is to be cashed out in terms of a greater degree or depth of remorse being ex-
pected of the greater scoundrel. This seems uncontroversial so far as it goes, but it 
is not clear why that in itself should make rewarding the achievement of that deeper 
remorse inappropriate with a reduction of sentence. 
 
Turning now to the first premise, it may be asked whether an offender is simply 
“obliged” to feel remorse. While it would seem wrong to deny this outright (as if 
experiencing remorse was in fact supererogatory or, alternatively, always merely 
permissible), I would suggest that this deontological language does not do full 
justice to the particular way in which lucid, deep remorse stands as a normative 
ideal for wrongdoers. It is true enough that one who has wronged another should 
feel remorse, but one who really does experience remorse fully and deeply is often 
going beyond others’ ordinary “expectations” (predictive and normative). Thus, a 
kind of hope often accompanies such “expectation”, a hope, however, which is not 
wholly captured by the notion of “going beyond one’s duty”. Moreover, and again 
this complicates matters, from that remorseful person’s point of view it will often 
strike them that they are simply experiencing “what they must”, given what hap-
pened. Consider also the common thought that an offender suffering remorse de-
serves to suffer such pain, as though the remorse itself is a received punishment. 
Though this thought is slightly misconceived, it does serve to show the complexity 
of the matter. In short, the nature of remorse’s “normative pull” is not reducible 
without remainder to the language of obligation and its conceptual cognates. 
 
III RETRIBUTIVISM AND CULPABILITY 
Bagaric and Amarasekara then turn to examining how the remorse principle may or 
may not receive support from what they take to be the two main justificatory theo-
ries of punishment — utilitarianism and retributivism — and argue that neither 
supports the remorse principle. That some such doctrinal support is necessary for 
the principle to stand is made clear but not questioned: “in order for remorse to be 
justifiable as a sentencing consideration, it must in some way relate to the purpose 
for punishing offenders in the first place”.11
 
In relation, first, to retributivism, Bagaric and Amarasekara argue that the influen-
tial version of retributivism put forward by von Hirsch has no room for remorse.12 
Von Hirsch’s retributivism, they argue, is concerned essentially with imposing 
11 Id., at 367. 
12 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993). 
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proportional punishment. That is understood by von Hirsch to be a matter of the 
severity of a penalty being determined by reference to the seriousness of the of-
fence, with the latter, in turn, being a matter of the harmfulness of the offending 
conduct combined with the extent of the offender’s culpability.13 Bagaric and 
Amarasekara argue that remorse, as a post-offence change in the offender, thus does 
not figure in the equation,14 and indeed it seems not to. 
 
However, regardless of the merits of Bagaric and Amarasekara’s critique of von 
Hirsch, it would seem quite possible for a recognisably retributivist sentencer (even 
one very sympathetic to von Hirsch’s approach) to expand the scope of the notion 
of “culpability” so that it incorporates post-offence matters such as remorse. Culpa-
bility, it may be argued, is essentially a matter of blameworthiness, that is of the 
worthiness or aptness of blaming the offender for what they did. “Blaming” here 
refers not only to the ascription of agent responsibility but also and primarily to the 
speech act (subsequent to affixing responsibility) of censuring or reproaching the 
offender, that is the opposite of praising. Thus an offender’s level of blameworthi-
ness need not simply be a measure of the responsibility of the offender for their 
actions (as a matter of free will, intentionality, level of care taken, etc.) but also a 
measure of how severely and in what manner they should now be censured for what 
they did. 
 
Since such censure is to be done at a time after the offence (let us say the offence 
occurred on January 1st and the time of censure is March 3rd), the decision must be 
made as to how to censure the offender on March 3rd, which may not be the same as 
the kind of censure that was appropriate on January 2nd. Thus there is room to take 
into account events that occur after January 1st, and indeed after January 2nd, but 
before March 3rd — and the offender’s remorse is a prime candidate here. To decide 
to punish the offender less severely on March 3rd than one would have punished 
them on January 2nd on the basis of them experiencing remorse after January 2nd is 
not at all to imply that the offender was any the less responsible for their actions on 
January 1st. It may well be true to say that remorse is irrelevant to the level of re-
sponsibility of the offender on January 1st, but it need not be irrelevant to the ques-
tion of their culpability or blameworthiness on March 3rd. (This is not yet, of course, 
to argue that a retributivist ought to take post-offence remorse into account, only 
that it is consistent for one to do so.) Since a recognisably retributivist approach 
could take on board post-offence remorse, it would seem that Bagaric and Ama-
rasekara’s criticism of von Hirsch’s retributivism as a support for remorse as a 
mitigating factor does not knock out retributivism as such as a possible support for 





13 Id. at 29. 
14 Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 1, at 367. 
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IV COMMUNICATIVE RETRIBUTIVISM 
Bagaric and Amarasekara do indeed go on to consider a different retributivist 
theory, that of R. A. Duff. They argue that the remorse principle is not supported by 
Duff’s theory, either, despite the fact that remorse plays a central role in it. Bagaric 
and Amarasekara’s argument is that in fact Duff’s whole enterprise fails because it 
cannot justify, in its own “communicative” terms, the hard treatment of offenders, 
and so any support Duff’s theory might be thought to offer the remorse principle 
will also fail. 
 
In very short compass, Duff’s general theory proposes that punishment be con-
ceived as communication of censure to and imposition of (secular) penance upon an 
offender. He argues that punishment should aim at “the three goals of repentance, 
reform and reconciliation. These goals are to be pursued by a communicative proc-
ess of imposing penitential burdens on offenders”.15 The moral basis of Duff’s 
approach is essentially respect for the offender as both an autonomous human being 
and a member of our community. That is, we ought to regard an offender as “one of 
us” and so one with whom we should first try to speak and reason, before we give 
up and resort merely to forms of self-release (such as revenge) or utilitarian ma-
nipulation. Remorse will clearly play a major role in such an approach. The com-
municative response to — the censuring of — the offender seeks to elicit remorse 
both as “an appropriate response to the wrong he has done” and as the “intrinsically 
appropriate way in which those goals [of self-reform and reconciliation] should be 
pursued”.16
 
Bagaric and Amarasekara argue that this communicative function cannot in fact 
warrant the hard treatment that defines punishment. Regardless, however, of 
whether Bagaric and Amarasekara’s general critique of Duff succeeds, it is impor-
tant to note that Duff himself argues that his account “does not imply that repen-
tance should entitle the offender to a lighter sentence”,17 as indeed Bagaric and 
Amarasekara acknowledge,18 though referring to Duff’s earlier work.19 (We can 
treat remorse and repentance as similar enough for present purposes.) So, it would 
appear that Duff’s general account of punishment does not support the remorse 
principle in the eyes of either its proponent or its detractors. Bagaric and Ama-
rasekara might argue that Duff is inconsistent here, but, either way, their position 
seems assured: Duff’s approach to sentencing provides no support for the remorse 
principle. Given this, it would seem that Bagaric and Amarasekara’s critique of 
Duff in their 2001 paper is unnecessary, unless they show, which they do not, how a 
Duffian approach might, despite Duff’s own arguments, argue for the remorse 
principle. Such an approach I want to outline here: I want to suggest that a commu-
15 DUFF, supra note 3, at 107. This work, which contains Duff’s main recent presentation of his ap-
proach, was published after Bagaric and Amarasekara, supra note 1, had been accepted for publication. 
16 Id. at 118. 
17 Id. at 120. 
18 Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 1, at 370. 
19 R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS (1986). 
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nicative approach can indeed support the remorse principle. I shall outline how by 
responding to Duff’s own arguments against the remorse principle. 
 
In brief, Duff presents two reasons for rejecting the remorse principle.20 (Strictly 
speaking, Duff appears to refer to the stronger view that remorse should mitigate 
sentence. To deny that proposition is consistent with defending remorse as a per-
missible mitigating factor. However, Duff’s arguments seem to be against the 
permissive version, too.) First, he endorses the von Hirschian point considered 
above that the principle of proportionality means that a lessening of the severity of 
the sentence would imply that the offence was less serious simply because of the 
post-offence remorse. (He does note, though, that immediate post-offence remorse 
may in some cases in fact lessen the seriousness of the crime itself.) Secondly, Duff 
argues that it is mistaken to think there is a distinct repentance-inducing stage of the 
sentence which should be mitigated in light of its redundancy in the case of the 
remorseful offender. Duff argues that, from the remorseful offender’s point of view, 
undergoing the punishment serves also to communicate their own repentance, and it 
is not feasible or appropriate to separate out distinct remorse-inducing and repen-
tance-expressing stages: “the whole sentence serves the dual purpose of inducing 
and expressing repentance”.21
 
In reply to Duff, I argue as follows. First, as already suggested above, it would 
seem possible — especially in the context of a communicative approach to sentenc-
ing — to broaden the scope of proportionality to include an expanded sense of the 
blameworthiness of the offender, in which post-offence remorse plays a role. The 
just punishment is a proportionate censuring address — not just about the offending 
conduct but also to a human being at a certain stage in the “narrative unfolding” of 
their life since that conduct. Thus the content of the punishment (what is imposed) 
should not be identified solely with the referential content of the communicative 
statement that the punishment is taken to express (for example, “the grave wrong 
that you did”). It can also express the communicative modulation that can result 
from awareness of changes in one’s interlocutor. This latter aspect makes it more 
plausible that the act of blaming may be properly influenced by events in the of-
fender’s life since the offence. Duff argues, however, that criminal liability should 
be grounded only in action and not in “character”.22 There is an important point 
here, but perhaps with remorse we can see a blurring of the distinction between 
conduct and character; and, with the temporal character of communication in mind, 
it becomes harder to disregard the fuller “character” of the human being we address. 
 
Secondly, a communicative endorsement of the remorse principle does not need to 
think in terms of “distinct” stages of the punishment for there to be some symbolic 
value in recognising or acknowledging the value of the offender’s remorse by way 
of mitigation of sentence. Such mitigation is not based on “redundancy”, nor is it a 
“reward”. It is, rather, more a matter of acknowledging the remorse and repentance 
20 DUFF, supra note 3, at 118–121. 
21 Id. at 121. 
22 Id. at 215 n. 48. 
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in a way that symbolizes the kind of acknowledgment we might accord a person 
whom we (informally) reproach in a purely verbal, non-punitive context — that is, 
perhaps by lowering our voice, choosing different words, reducing the intensity of 
the rebuke, pausing and listening to the other person’s apology, and so on. If institu-
tional punishment can symbolise verbal censure, it ought also to be able to symbol-
ise modulations of such censure in response to expressed remorse. Of course, such 
modulation does not necessarily have to take the form of reduction of sentence 
severity. But such a form of modulation is, it would seem, clearly a possible one 
and, indeed, one that is likely to be commonly chosen. This also shows why re-
morse does not require mitigation of sentence to zero: the wrong that was done and 
suffered still needs to be said. The communicative act is not merely a conveying of 
information, but also a performative commemoration of the events, a common, 
shared saying — in which the repentant offender still needs to share, not despite of 
but because of their repentant understanding of the past. 
 
So much for my Duffian reply to Duff. With regard to Bagaric and Amarasekara’s 
criticisms of Duff’s general theory, these are essentially the same as those they level 
at him in an earlier work.23 Duff himself has already replied to those criticisms,24 
and I shall simply refer the reader to that exchange rather than rehearse it here. 
V UTILITARIANISM AND REMORSE 
Having dealt with two kinds of retributive theory, Bagaric and Amarasekara go on 
to argue that utilitarian theories of punishment fare no better in providing support 
for the remorse principle. They consider, in particular, specific deterrence and 
rehabilitation, and, again, their argument is that the purported justifications of 
punishment fail generally and so do not stand so as to provide incidental support for 
the remorse principle. 
 
A  Deterrence 
In relation to specific deterrence, Bagaric and Amarasekara note that one might 
expect that since a repentant offender is, presumably, less likely to re-offend, there 
is a reduced need to deter such an offender by way of punishment. It would be 
redundant and so parsimony would require that we scale back the punishment 
appropriately. Bagaric and Amarasekara argue, however, that this argument fails as 
there is insufficient empirical support for the claim that punishment deters offenders 
from re-offending. 
 
Whether punishment does specifically deter and, if so, to what extent, are of course 
difficult questions to answer. However, regardless of the ultimate findings of crimi-
23 Mirko Bagaric and Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 124 
(2000) 
24 R. A. Duff, In Defence of One Type of Retributivism: A Reply to Bagaric and Amarasekara, 24 
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 411 (2000) 
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nology concerning general behaviour patters, if a judge was faced with a particular 
case in which they were justifiably confident that this offender would likely be 
deterred by a particular punishment, then it appears that Bagaric and Amarasekara 
would, on utilitarian grounds, allow the remorse principle to apply (other conditions 
being met). However, the further sticking point here, according to Bagaric and 
Amarasekara, is that neither is there sufficient evidence to show that in general, 
remorseful offenders re-offend less than non-remorseful offenders. Though this 
conclusion seems premature, given the limited extent of research in the area,25 in 
any case the same point applies: if our judge was justifiably satisfied that this re-
morseful offender is less likely to re-offend because of their remorse, then they 
could mitigate their punishment, following the redundancy rationale. That is, what-
ever the general behavioural trends, a particular instance is enough to warrant 
application of the remorse principle to it. General trends and patterns are relevant to 
“larger” policy matters such as prison funding or the training of welfare officers. 
But when it comes to proposals to guide (or possibly even constrain) judicial discre-
tion in particular sentencing decisions, scope ought to be preserved for a judge to 
deal with the “anomalous” particular offender “on their merits” (utilitarian or oth-
erwise). There is no loss of utility in doing so. 
 
One important type of utilitarian approach to punishment that Bagaric and Ama-
rasekara do not consider is that of general deterrence. Is there an argument for the 
remorse principle that derives from this approach? It might be thought that a “strict” 
criminal justice system that did not treat remorse as a mitigating factor might prove 
a more frightening prospect to potential offenders, so that the remorse principle 
would not find support here. However, it would appear that an argument for the 
remorse principle can be mounted that addresses the concerns of the general deter-
rence sentencer, as follows. Given that the remorse principle reflects a widely held 
view, a failure to put it into practice runs the risk of bringing the criminal justice 
system into disrepute. Observers in the community may then feel less respect for 
such a system and in turn this could contribute to greater disobedience of the law. 
To be sure, this is not a very strong argument, but it does lend some utilitarian 
weight to the remorse principle. 
 
B  Rehabilitation 
Bagaric and Amarasekara note26 that, assuming a link between remorse and less 
recidivism, remorse also seems to make rehabilitative punishment redundant, at 
least to some degree. However, they argue that rehabilitation and punishment may 
be inconsistent, insofar as rehabilitative programmes are like beneficial social 
services, while punishment must, by definition, be painful. If it is true that rehabili-
tation must stand as an alternative type of sentence to punishment, then offender 
remorse cannot serve to “mitigate punishment” in the eyes of a pure rehabilitator, 
since there is no punishment to mitigate. 
25 See Proeve et al., supra note 5, at 22–3. 
26 Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 1, at 371. 
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Let us grant the inconsistency of rehabilitation and punishment. What, then, do we 
do with a remorseful offender where we seek rehabilitation but eschew punishment 
as a rehabilitative tool? Such remorse can no longer mitigate punishment, but, from 
a utilitarian point of view, the redundancy argument is still important: unnecessary 
rehabilitative programmes would be a waste of the community’s resources and the 
offender’s time, and so we should spend no more of either than is needed. Here the 
concern is with “mitigating” spending and waste rather than punishment, and it 
includes as much the community’s interests as it does the offender’s, but the point 
remains that remorse is still relevant as a mitigating factor in sentencing. 
 
But is imposing pain always inconsistent with rehabilitation? At least sometimes, I 
would claim, an effective kind of (behavioural) rehabilitation is through an (“in-
ner”) reform whereby an offender is censured by way of punishment and experi-
ences shame and remorse (not necessarily always due solely to that censure). From 
that painful confrontation with their past, some such offenders may then success-
fully amend their future conduct. If this is possible, then pre-censure remorse would 
still have an “in principle” role in mitigating the censure. Again, so long as such a 
scenario is possible, individual judges ought to be free to take remorse into consid-
eration in particular cases where they find the appropriate facts. 
 
There might, however, be a genuinely remorseful offender who lucidly seeks not to 
have their punishment mitigated, but is prepared, precisely because they are re-
morseful and repentant, to undertake the full measure of their punishment. This, of 
course, does not exactly lend weight to the remorse principle. However, whether a 
sentencing court should accede to such an offender’s wish is another matter, since 
the court is not there simply to grant either victims or offenders what they wish, 
even if it be reasonable for them to wish it. 
VI FORGIVENESS 
Bagaric and Amarasekara also argue that forgiveness cannot support the remorse 
principle, essentially because forgiveness, as a private matter involving discretion, 
relational ties and (usually) minor wrongs, has no role to play in a public criminal 
justice system. However, it is too bald to say that a public court may never treat a 
victim’s forgiveness of a remorseful offender as a mitigating factor. The law and 
people’s private moral worlds can and do properly intersect, and a public court, 
even though representing the community rather than the victim, is not obliged never 
to take a victim’s views into account. It can, indeed, be part of its public function of 
representing the community’s collective response to events primarily affecting 
certain of its individual members that a court in some way take account of victims, 
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VII RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACHES 
Bagaric and Amarasekara finally look briefly at the role of remorse in restorative 
justice models. It is not clear whether restorative justice approaches actually have a 
clear place for a notion such as “mitigation of the normal sentence”, for sentencing 
in the traditional mode is partly what restorative justice has sought to replace or at 
least to complement by allowing for more varied, negotiated and particularised 
outcomes. It would seem fairly clear, however, that an offender’s remorse has a 
very important role to play in most restorative justice models, in that they highly 
value the responsiveness of offenders to what they have done and, indeed, what is 
happening to them now.27 It would seem an odd restorative justice conference that 
did not positively acknowledge an offender’s remorse and somehow lessen the 
intensity of the “reintegrative shaming” that the conference was partly intended to 
induce. 
 
Bagaric and Amarasekara suggest that remorse is expected of offenders in restora-
tive justice settings and so is a “necessary but not sufficient pre-condition for the 
integration of the offender back into society. The pain of recompense and reassur-
ance must yet be met”.28 That may be true, but it does not yet tell against the idea 
that satisfying one of those pre-conditions may partly lessen the overall burden an 
offender might come to bear through a restorative justice approach. Thus, remorse 
still seems to retain its mitigating possibilities in this context. 
 
VIII CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, then, Bagaric and Amarasekara’s survey of reasons for the remorse 
principle is not wide enough to enable them to argue that if those purported reasons 
fail (which, they say, they do), then there is no good reason to accept the remorse 
principle. (I should note that I have not sought here to make up the gap by provid-
ing my own, full survey of what may be said in favour of the remorse principle.) 
Moreover, most of their arguments against the reasons that they do consider are, at 
least, controversial. So, even if we granted that the survey was exhaustive, it would 
be unwise yet to lobby Parliament to prohibit courts from treating offenders’ re-
morse as a mitigating factor when sentencing them. 
 
Perhaps ultimately the remorse principle can be as much a test of an adequate 
theory of sentencing as it is something that stands in need of a theory’s support. 
That is to say, if one’s preferred theory of sentencing cannot accommodate this 
basic principle, it may be that the theory needs revising and not that the remorse 
principle needs to be abandoned.29
27 See, e.g., Ted Wachtel & Paul McCold, Restorative Justice In Everyday Life, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY 128 (H. Strang & J. Braithwaite eds., 2001), and CHARLES K. BARTON, 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE EMPOWERMENT MODEL 135 (2003). 
28 Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 1, at 375. 
29 I would like to thank Professor Bagaric and Professor Duff for their generosity in each commenting on 
an earlier draft of this article. 
